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A stra t 
The evaluation of the Paris Peace Conference or the “Versailles–Washington world 
order” is one of the most widely discussed sub ects in the study of history and 
international relations. The abundance of research and assessment is partly down to the 
formative character of the post-WWI peace on the national consciousness of many states 
and to the term  Versailles’ which has become an oft-recurring keyword in the analysis 
of international relations. Due to the sheer volume of accounts, a historiography of the 
Paris Peace Conference is inevitably a collection of the author’s own discretion. This 
paper focuses on the international historiography of the Paris Peace Conference and its 
conse uences, and argues that after the consolidation of orthodoxies following 1919, and 
the triumph of revisionist history in the late-19 0s, the scholarly community is now 
experiencing another reappraisal – beginning from the 2010s. 
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A   e inal Catastro  e  
A number of attendants at the Peace Conference were themselves historians, and all sorts 
of academics were present to provide scientifically grounded advice for the conference: 
Harold Tamperley, R. W. Seton-Watson, Charles Seignobos,  mile Boutroux and Harold 
Nicolson, to name but a few (Irish, 201   Nielson, 1992). Such first-hand experience 
contributed to a surge in historical studies later on. 
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Not long after the conference, both sides assembled relevant documents about 
what led to the Great War. Harold Temperley and G. P. Gooch started to work on a 
documentary series already in 192 : the Briti    o  ment  on t e  rigin  o   ar 
(Gooch Temperley, 192 ). Harold Nicolson, already aware of the historical significance 
of peacemaking in 1919, and studying the Vienna Congress of 1 1  during those days, 
made two important contributions: the publication of his Pea emaking      (19  ) about 
Paris, and his   St dy in  llied  nity (19  ) about the Vienna Congress (Nicolson, 19  , 
19  ). R. W. Seton-Watson, an ardent activist and supporter of  autonomies’ in Eastern 
Europe, also published his T e  rigin  o   ar in 192 . Most of the early works tried to 
prove Germany’s extranormal behavior that had led to war in 191 . The British collection 
of documents edited by Temperley and Gooch was more balanced due to the involvement 
of Gooch, whose professional interest was German history. He was specifically asked to 
take part for this reason, to make the o    less biased. 
Academics sought answer to the  uestion whether the settlement was  ust and 
effective. The most debated point to emerge was the  origins of World War I,’ i.e. who 
bore responsibility for the outbreak of the war. This held ma or implications: if Germany 
could be proved to have been the ultimate aggressor then even a  Carthaginian peace’ 
could be  ustified while if the Entente powers were those who bullied Germany into war 
then harsh peace terms may  ualify as outright predatory. To determine this issue was the 
purpose of the documentary collection of Temperley and Gooch but it also had a 
German counterpart, the  0-volume  ie Gro  e Politik der e ro  i   en Ka inette. The 
German Foreign Office employed a complete section for investigating  war guilt’ and 
supplying material to attack its basis in international politics.  ater on, French and 
Russian collections were also assembled. Gyula Andrássy Jr., the last foreign minister of 
Austria–Hungary, published his  i loma y and  orld  ar in the mid-1920s. With those 
collections a ma or problem was their presupposition that the most important decisions 
were made in cabinet offices and ministries. They thus downplayed social developments 
and the role of the militaries (Mulligan, 201 ). 
The second issue of debate was whether the losses of the defeated countries were 
acceptable or not in a civilized framework. The idea that the Versailles settlement was a 
 Carthaginian peace’ sharply divided international public opinion. 
A third issue was national self-determination a legal notion that became the 
cornerstone of the post-war settlement in spite of its essentially contested nature. How 
could one claim self-determination for oppressed nations on the one hand, and disregard 
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the same demand from others  The idea of Wilsonism and liberal internationalism was 
clearly in contradiction with the outcomes in many cases.  et, as the logic of much early 
scholarship implied, if the settlement was practical and beneficial, then it must have been 
the result of the infusion of Wilsonism into European politics. If it was not, however, than 
the  uestion becomes whether it was predatory and ignorant  e a  e o  or in   ite o  
Wilsonian ideas (cf. Anievas, 201 :  19– 20). If Wilson’s intentions were the best and 
the results of the treaty were devastating, how did the process of implementing Wilson’s 
programme end up derailed  A fourth ma or  uestion was the economy: did the settlement 
create the framework for a European reconstruction with which the war could be ended 
not only between the armies but between the treasuries as well  Or was it non-viable from 
the beginning, only to lead to further deteriorating conditions  This last  uestion was 
probably the first to be studied seriously in the early stages. 
The most influential historiographical piece did not come from historians rather 
from a delegate of the British Treasury, John Maynard Keynes. He was urged to make an 
account by the South African statesman Jan Smuts (Bottom, 200 :  ). Keynes wrote his 
seminal work on the Peace Conference in a very short period of time: T e   onomi  
 on e  en e  o  Peace came out in 1919. Keynes’ work cemented his role as the leading 
economist of his age, provided munition for those already disenchanted by the Paris Peace 
Conference, and set up a line of thought that many would follow in the mid-20th century. 
On the other hand, Keynes’ book was sketchy, mostly concentrated on the economy, and 
did not take the political context much into account. He characterized the Treaty of 
Versailles as a  Carthaginian peace’, i.e. as one that was insensitive to the van uished and 
economically short-sighted.  ater historiography and assessment basically did away with 
this notion albeit only at the beginning of the 21st century. Keynes’ theses were often 
cited as prophetic: he maintained that the economic devastation of Europe, one-sided 
entente policies, and Germany’s rightful sense of humiliation would inevitably lead to 
another arms race and war. 
Another interpretation which took shape in the earliest days was the Marxist–
 eninist interpretation, formulated by  enin himself. At the Third International, he said, 
“Versailles has proved even to the stupid and blind     that the Entente was and is as 
bloody and filthy an imperialist predator as Germany” ( enin, 1919). As the hopes for a 
wildfire-like world revolution faded away,  enin and the Bolsheviks hammered out a 
different interpretation which amusingly combined teleological internationalism with 
Russian realism. In essence,  enin argued that the nations punished with the peace treaties 
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were by then colonies in all but name, and their sufferings and humiliation would 
eventually lead to further crises of capitalism. The idea that war emanated from 
intracapitalist crises, and peace only further sharpened them, became the blueprint of 
Soviet strategic thinking. It was not only an analysis but a plan for action. The humiliated 
masses would search for a leader and now Germany dispossessed by the capitalist world 
order would take this position (Harding, 2009: 2  –2 9). A continuation of this line of 
thought could be that the advanced capitalist powers managed to sub ugate Eastern 
European nations into a  uasi-colonial status. From a Bolshevik perspective it may be 
lamentable but more importantly, it provided an opportunity to react to  predatory’ 
capitalism. Marxist interpretations proved surprisingly resistant to change through time 
and were canonized as the only acceptable outlook in Soviet Russia, and among most 
Communists and radical Socialists. It did not, however, penetrate into non-extreme  eftist 
thinking at the time: the local  eft typically framed the treaty in local terms, e.g. the 
Hungarian socialists blamed the pre-war Hungarian élite (cf. Romsics, 201 :    –  2). 
Aside from official policy, American interpretations among the more liberal 
sections of society began to emerge right after the war. Apart from a critical realist 
tradition, official sentiments in the U.S. were often characterized by the work of Ray 
Stannard Baker. He was press secretary to President Woodrow Wilson during the 
conference and caretaker of the president’s papers. Baker published T e P  li  Pa er  o  
 oodro   il on in six volumes (192 –192 ) and  oodro   il on   i e and  etter  in 
eight volumes (192 –19 9). In this standard American view, President Woodrow Wilson 
was a heroic leader whose mission was thwarted by cynical European leaders. In fact, the 
growth of anti-European sentiment was apparent in interwar American historiography 
(Widenor, 199 :    –   ). 
This American development was in serious contrast to the British public opinion. 
For the latter, revisionism came so early and became so pervasive that it became “more 
dominant than the interpretation that was intended to be the orthodoxy” (Fry, 199 ).  
Similar bifurcation can be observed in most national historiographies: defeated 
powers or who perceived themselves as such adopted arguments and approaches from 
revisionist, Keynesian, or  eninist interpretations, while those conceived as  winners’ and 
the East European  successor states’ tended to build on  internationalist’ narratives 
while engaging in nationalist nation-building at home (Zimmer, 201 : 2– ). 
The coming World War II meant that the terrible conse uences the peace was 
foretold to create in some of the abovementioned narratives would ultimately prove real. 
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The British public started to see Germany as a  valiant foe’ disproportionately and 
dishonestly punished by a haughty ally. The official French ideology, and her East 
European allies, espoused a strong sense of achievement related to the Great War and the 
enormous work the Peace Conference (Orzoff, 2009). Keynes himself was even declared 
 er ona non grata in France (Sampaio, 201 ). The same can be said of the reputation of 
Keynes’ work by then: while it has been translated to both German and Hungarian already 
in 1920, a Romanian translation was not produced during the interwar years. With the 
 Versailles order’ crumbling, the prestige of the late President Wilson and that of liberal 
internationalism as such was also on the ebb. 
Criticism even reached the personal traits of President Wilson: William C. 
Bullitt a young diplomat present at the peace conference and later the U.S. ambassador 
to Moscow co-authored a book on the president’s mental character with Sigmund 
Freud. Bullitt, influenced by his experience of being sidelined at the Paris negotiations, 
disparaged President Wilson so much so that the book could not come out for decades 
(Kennan, 19 2). The final years before WWII somewhat changed this anti-Versailles 
mood: Ray Baker was awarded Pulitzer Prizes for his books on Wilson, and a positive 
assessment albeit modified was cautiously put forward. According to this new 
interpretation, Wilson remained courageous and good-willing throughout the peace 
conference but his untainted American ideas were compromised by shrewd European 
leaders and his own chief advisor Colonel House. Foremost among those proposing this 
view was Paul Birdsall in his 19 1  er aille  T enty  ear    ter (Tanner, 200 :  9– 2). 
This dichotomy of American naivety and cosmopolitan European shrewdness was a 
ma or leitmotif of interwar American literature and it may have been reverberated by such 
an appraisal of the activities of President Wilson. 
The coming of the Second World War on the one hand provided a canvas against 
which the story of the Versailles peace could be interpreted while the war itself eclipsed 
its importance. The rise and fall of Nazi Germany had a twofold effect: it diminished 
sympathy for Germany even as it added to the blaming the Versailles diktat for the gradual 
undoing of Europe in the interwar years. The British historian A. J. P. Taylor’s T e 
 o r e o  German  i tory, completed in 19  , aimed at informing the con uerors what 
kind of country they set out to govern. Taylor’s strict verdict and pessimistic outlook was 
later refined but one postwar tradition highlighted by his work was an assumed  direct 
link’ between  Prussian militarism’ and Nazism. On the other hand, German historians, 
among them Gerhard Ritter in the first place, emphasized the aberration that Nazism 
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constituted in German history and pointed to the flawed but still civilized or  normal’ 
nature of the Wilhelmine  ei  . In the 19 0s, the so-called Fischer Controversy was a 
ma or development in the Federal Republic: the historian Fritz Fischer argued that it was 
indeed German obsession with war that resulted in the outbreak of the war and thus the 
war guilt claim was at least partly  ustified, he concluded. Fischer’s views gradually 
gained appreciation and by the late-19 0s represented a new orthodoxy in German 
historiography (Mulligan, 201 ). 
Eventually an anti-treaty school of American public thinkers emerged building 
on the traditions of Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Cabot  odge, etc. a realist criti ue of 
the Versailles settlement as well as American Cold War policy thereby also arose: in the 
works of Hans Morgenthau, George F. Kennan, or Norman A. Graebner. On the other 
hand, those who were forming a public discourse on the U.S. role in the world emphasised 
the idea of  a second chance’ to set the course of American foreign policy right. The 
Wilsonian approach was regarded as providing the moral underpinnings for a Cold War 
consensus on an active U.S. foreign policy (Ambrosius, 19  : 199, 21 ). Wilsonism, from 
this time on, became intellectual shorthand for the emerging  interventionist’ consensus 
in Washington. 
What was possibly one of the ma or sources of reassessment went perfectly 
unnoticed at the time. Henry Kissinger’s 19   thesis at Harvard examined the 1 1  
Congress of Vienna and praised its commitment to restraint and the balance-of-power 
principle. A relative unknown at the time of writing his thesis, Kissinger was destined to 
become one of the ma or influences in the historiography of Versailles, even as, in the 
late-19 0s, New  eft history emerged in the U.S., with direct links to political opposition 
movements in the U.S. As Ambrosius points out, the heated criticism of the Vietnam war, 
a key point in New  eft discourse, itself was an offshoot of Wilsonian thinking. The New 
 eft targeted the realist concepts of foreign policy and mostly viewed Wilson’s effort to 
make peace at the end of WWI as genuine and  ust, only to be corrupted either by 
American domestic policies, by the personal deficiencies of key leaders, or by European 
partners as such (Ambrosius, 19  : 202–20 ). 
Perhaps one of the most important works written under the influence of this type 
of thinking is Politi   and  i loma y o  Pea emaking by Arno J. Mayer for whom the 
idealist, internationalist impulses of Wilson were derailed by what he perceived as the 
counterrevolutionary structural forces. He considered the events of the Russian 
Revolution paramount to the understanding of the Paris Peace Conference and thought 
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that the Versailles settlement was a pre-emptive counterrevolutionary strike. Before his 
work, the immense impact of Bolshevism on Wilsonianism was underplayed. He is also 
credited with the introduction of the simple but powerful dichotomy of “ enin vs. 
Wilson” (Mayer, 19    Trachtenberg, 2000  Manela, 200 ). 
By the 19 0s,  trenches’ in historiography were  uite clear: socialist 
historiography in Eastern Europe championed different variants of the  eninists tradition, 
condemning Versailles as a  carnival’ of imperialist predators  while most American and 
British historians thought that the intentions were good but the result was disastrous. They 
thus tried to figure out what went wrong  in the meantime, continental Europeans 
emphasised Germany’s paramount responsibility even as they discarded the peacemakers 
as short-sighted and incompetent at best (Kissinger, 199 ). On the other side of the 
Atlantic, the most influential piece that exemplified the “postwar consensus” was A. J. P. 
Taylor’s T e  rigin  o  t e Se ond  orld  ar in which he argued that the failures of the 
Versailles treaty system, its illegitimacy, immorality, and strategic lopsidedness sowed 
the seeds of destruction of WWII (Taylor, 19 1). The paramount American strategic 
thinker George F. Kennan succinctly summarized this outlook calling the First World 
War  the seminal catastrophe’ of the 20th century.  
 
A ne  s  olarl   onsensus 
From the late-19 0s on, the study of the Versailles settlement was infused with new inputs 
in a remarkably dual way. First, the archives were finally opening their doors, allowing 
researchers to broaden their base of primary sources, while historians were increasingly 
preoccupied with social developments as opposed to pure diplomatic history. All of this 
resulted in a number of new findings and approaches: a more precise reconstruction of 
diplomatic transactions, and an attempt to thoroughly understand social backgrounds. 
This is a time when  lltag ge   i  te, or the history of war and peace seen from below, 
came to fashion in Germany and also in broader international historiography (Horne, 
201 :  2 ). 
As the archives were opening after the expiry of the regular fifty-year rule, a 
renewed interest in the war came to fruition. The most important were the British archives 
due to the more committed recording traditions of the British cabinet (Boemeke 
Feldman Glaser, 199 :  –10). Organizational and bureaucratic matters of the 
conference were also coming to the forefront. A one-time British representative of the 
conference, Sir Harold Nicolson, published his own research-based memoirs in 19  , 
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which paved the way for this approach. According to Nicolson’s argument, a huge 
bureaucracy met contradictory issues and wait-and-see politicians, and this resulted in a 
crisis of priorities and attention (Nicolson, 19    Tanner, 200    ukacs, 201   Marks, 
201 ). Michael Dockrill and Zara Steiner were following this line of research when they 
reconstructed how the administration of foreign policy was challenged by politics and 
international realities during the conference (Dockrill Steiner, 19 0). 
The French, hitherto the staunchest defenders of the Versailles settlement, started 
to revise their outlook in the late 19 0s, while, a few years later, there emerged a fresh 
interest in small states’ approaches and economic history (Boemeke Feldman Glaser 
199 :  –10). Pierre Renouvin’s focus on the November 11 armistice was a 
groundbreaking work in 19 9,  ust like Pierre Mi uel’s attempt to focus on French public 
opinion. David Stevenson concentrated on Franco-American relations. Marc 
Trachtenberg in turn dealt with reparations, their supposed function, and their impact on 
the interwar years (Renouvin, 19 9  Mi uel, 19 2  Stevenson, 19 9  Trachtenberg, 
19 0). The late 19 0s then saw the first attempts at synthetizing the new approach. Henri 
Soutou’s    r et Sang (19 9), Alan Sharp’s T e  er aille  Settlement (1991), and the 
essay collection  er aille   e i ited (199 ) deserve distinguished attention. 
Georges-Henri Soutou’s   or et  ang used an abundance of new sources aiming 
at a redefinition of the war aims of the warring parties. Contrary to earlier notions taken 
at face-value,    r et  ang made it clear that the Entente and the Central Powers had 
specific and reasonable war aims. This entailed neither a defense of  moral values’, nor a 
 uest for world domination. Both France and Germany longed for broadening the 
territories under their economic sway so as to gain the upper-hand in postwar Europe. 
France’s proposal to include Belgium,  uxembourg, and possibly the Rhineland in a 
French-dominated customs union, coupled with the re-annexation of Alsace- orraine 
showed a striking similarity in nature and even some overlap in territory with the German 
Mittele ro a concept, which would include Belgium, Germany, Austria–Hungary and 
future Poland. With the clarification of opposing war aims, the diplomatic maneuvers of 
the last months of the war as well as the proceedings of the Paris Peace Conference 
became less of an ideological and more of an economic matter (Soutou, 19 9). 
Alan Sharp’s 1991 T e  er aille  Settlement set the tone for a new  udgment of 
WWI’s ending. Sharp did not hide the deficiencies of the peacemakers, although he 
based on  loyd George’s own assessment claimed the problems the peace conference 
was facing were even more momentous than the Congress of Vienna did once, as they 
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did involve more than one continent. It is not surprising that the task proved to be 
insurmountable, especially given the fact that there were no enforcement mechanisms put 
in place after the conference. Neither the British, nor the Americans were willing to 
maintain  the Versailles order’ while the French were running out of means. 
Circumstances indeed led to another war in 19 9, but it was not a determined course from 
the conclusion of the peace (Sharp, 1991). 
Perhaps the most influential piece of scholarship that mirrored this newer 
approach was the volume published by the German Historical Institute in 199 , edited by 
Manfred F. Boemeke, Gerald D. Feldman and Elisabeth Glaser. The most relevant piece 
for the purpose of this study was written by William R. Keylor. His “Versailles and 
International Diplomacy” became the highest  uality manifestation of the  uestion of 
how to evaluate the Paris Peace Conference in the light of recent findings. In his superb 
account, he deconstructs three ma or to oi of the settlement. First, the notion of open 
diplomacy that actually resulted in the most secretive type of proceedings at the 
conference (Keylor, 199 :   1–   ). Second, the reparations  uestion and the  war guilt 
clause:’ he convincingly argues that the latter was indeed a legal trick included in the 
treaty as a guarantee against which payment conditions of Germany could be eased 
(Keylor, 199     – 01). On the other hand, Trachtenberg points out the  punitive 
measures’ present in Wilson’s thinking and his determination to teach  a historic lesson’ 
to the transgressor Germany. Even if the  war guilt clause’ was not to stigmatize 
Germany, the whole discourse of postwar internationalism was in fact humiliating and 
short-sighted (Trachtenberg, 2000: 199–200). 
Third, Keylor elaborated on the issue of self-determination and its relationship to 
Wilsonism. According to his assessment, self-determination was adopted late in the 
process and its ultimate fate to become a blank check for nation-states was a 
Europeanization of the principle. On the other hand, it was never applied to either West 
European nations or to those under colonial rule (Keylor, 199 :    ,  9 ). Fourth, Keylor 
sheds fresh light on the real meaning of the long-term effects of the territorial 
reconfiguration of Europe. As he points out, the weakest link of the  Germanic alliance,’ 
i.e. Austria–Hungary, was partitioned, while a little modified German unity was actually 
consecrated at Versailles. Furthermore, as the war was raging on the territory of the actual 
victors and resulted in the destruction of most of their industrial capacities, while the 
defeated power was never occupied, the  new Germany’ was not only almost whole but 
also economically intact (Keylor, 199 :  9 – 9 ). On the whole, allied statesmen 
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expressed “a remarkable degree of flexibility, pragmatism and moderation” (Keylor, 
199 :   1) and it was far from being a “Carthaginian peace,” and did not in fact cause the 
horrors of the interwar years and World War Two (Keylor, 199 :  90– 91). 
The role of the leading peacemakers was also reassessed, with Clemanceau 
absolved of most of the claims of vindictiveness (Soutou, 199 ), while  loyd George’s 
assessment turned somewhat more negative due to his insistence on the inclusion of 
military pensions in the German reparation issue ( entin, 199 ). Marc Trachtenberg did 
not agree with the more positive assessment expounded by Keylor: “With a little more 
honesty     and above all a little more brains, the story might have been very different 
indeed” (Trachtenberg, 2000: 20 ). In his “Comment,” Alan Sharp, in line with 
Nicolson’s recollections, states that participants of the peace conference did not have a 
clear sight of what they wanted. The relatively sudden end of the war did not leave enough 
time to consider which war aim to put forward in both armistice and peace negotiations, 
and all these were further complicated by the respective tactics of the other allies (Sharp 
199 ). Allied insistence on German payments even had the capacity to seriously hurt the 
victors: Niall Ferguson pointed out that German payments could only be made in time 
after seriously devaluing the  ei   mark to gain a surplus in foreign trade a move that 
in turn endangered the balance of payment of the victorious countries (Ferguson, 199 ). 
The French, while insisting on defense and reparations for their own national interest, had 
probably the soundest strategy from Armistice Day up to the time of the negotiations. 
According to Soutou’s study and Trachtenberg’s analysis, the French did take into 
account the necessity to cooperate with Germany if the  Anglo–Saxon’ guarantee was not 
forthcoming to France. In fact, Clemanceau saw a possible and limited Franco–German 
cooperation as a potential bulwark against both Bolshevism and  Anglo–Saxon’ 
domination of the continent. Although the seriousness of a potential rapprochement with 
Germany in French thinking is still debated, Trachtenberg concludes that French policy 
resembled something like an early Gaullism (Soutou, 199   Trachtenberg, 2000). Perhaps 
the most consensual part of the consensus was the resolute assessment that the failings of 
the Versailles treaty did not prescribe all the instability and horror that was to come in the 
interwar years: the rise of Fascism, economic nationalism, and bitter rivalries was not a 
predetermined conse uence of the war (Boemeke et al., 199   Trachtenberg, 2000  
Marks, 201 ). 
By the time the latter views were established as a new scholarly consensus, 
Margaret Macmillan came out with her book Pari      . The Canadian historian, herself 
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a great-granddaughter of  loyd George, offers a well-written account of the Paris Peace 
Conference, and more importantly, the origins and conse uences of each regional issue 
that emanated from the war. Macmillan’s book instantly rose to prominence and reached 
unseen popularity in this topic. Newer and newer editions came out, along with many 
translations. Macmillan, who is a professor of diplomatic history at the University of 
Oxford, is essentially seen as someone who mastered narrative history. Sally Marks, in 
her succinct criti ue of the book, pointed out some of the flaws that diplomatic historians 
tend to have with Macmillan’s account: the conflation of chronological and topical parts, 
a tendency of story-telling, a colorful but somewhat misleading basis of sources, some 
unintended faults that could have been avoided with more careful proof-reading, and a 
tendency to omit assessment, especially regarding the  lesser treaties.’ Macmillan’s ma or 
assertions actually follow the consensus established by the essay collection edited by 
Boemeke et al. Indeed, she did a great  ob in dispersing some of the most pervasive myths, 
i.e. that the treaty was in fact a  Carthaginian peace’  that reparations were huge and 
necessarily led to the ruining of German democracy  or that the peacemakers were 
vindictive, revengeful and short-sighted. His assessment of  loyd George is  uite 
positive, but at the same time she also highlights English Francophobia and acts of 
restraint and moderation on the part of Clemanceau. She does admit that faults were made 
in Paris especially regarding territories outside Europe but the European peace was 
the fairest settlement to come out of the unfair conditions created by the war (Marks, 
2001). The author blames procedural issues for the failings of the conference: too many 
topics, too much detail, too many things to decide in a disunited atmosphere. Her most 
original contribution is the emphasis on the classical education of the contemporary 
political class.  loyd George knew more about the geography of the ancient Middle East 
than that of Europe  Nicolson considered the Greeks the most gifted people on earth, 
while he saw the Turks as the most notorious despots. As the claims were conflicting and 
as the negotiations were often lacking direction, many issues were finally decided by the 
authority of the peacemakers alone. In these cases, their classical education and 
sympathies proved to be decisive (MacMillan, 2001  also highlighted by Marks, 2001). 
MacMillan argues that  loyd George did not know much about European geography but 
due to his religious education he was excellent in ancient names and locations in the land 
of Israel Palestine. When he said that the borders should be stretching “from Dan to 
Beersheba,” most of his contemporaries had to consult Biblical maps to cipher out the 
exact meaning of the Prime Minister’s words (MacMillan, 2001:  1 ). Such one-sided 
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knowledge, unpreparedness, coupled with the utmost secrecy and a massive bureaucracy 
flooded with and blocked in trivialities, resulted in ad  o  decisions, including the 
phenomenon of reaching decisions for the sake of reaching them. This is one of the points 
John  ukacs is referring to as a ma or fault in the peacemakers’ attitude at the conference 
( ukacs, 201 :   ). According to Macmillan’s reviewer, she wrote an excellent, though 
sometimes flawed account, which would help spread the historical consensus, but 
undoubtedly represents “an Anglo-American point of view, especially Anglo.” Most of 
the new scholarly consensus represented, in turn, if not an Anglo–American, but a 
distinctively Eurocentric viewpoint with the word Eurocentric used in a  West 
European’ sense. 
The archives were furnishing evidence for scholarship in Eastern Europe as well. 
There was already something to build on: as early as 19  , Norman Stone, with his 
command of both German and Hungarian, wrote a piece on “Hungary and the July Crisis” 
with a clear analysis of the strategic choices of Count Tisza, the Prime Minister of 
Hungary, a person hitherto seen in indiscriminately negative light (Stone, 19  ). From 
the 19 0s on, F. R. Bridge wrote extensively about Austria–Hungary and its participation 
in the war (Bridge, 19 2, 201 ). William Godsey analyzed the Austro–Hungarian Foreign 
Office and how it worked on the eve of the First World War (Godsey, 1999). Stone later 
wrote a synthesis on the diplomatic and military history of the Eastern Front (Stone, 
199 ). István Di szegi’s   ngarian  in t e Ball a   latz in 19   provided an insight 
into Austro–Hungarian foreign policy but his grand synthesis of the same topic is 
unfortunately only available in Hungarian (Di szegi, 19  , 2001). Géza Jeszenszky, 
former Minister of Foreign Affairs, wrote a piece about how European countries 
perceived Hungary and  Hungarianness’ through time, but the volume  z el e ztett 
 re zt z  (Pre tige  o t) is only available in Hungarian. Magda  dám’s T e  er aille  
Sy tem and  entral   ro e is a well-researched and well-written study from an East 
European angle ( dám, 200 ) and it in fact had a greater international impact than most 
of the above mentioned. 
 
   ires stri e  a   
Early works which  uestioned the consensus came, in a somewhat surprising way, from 
postcolonial studies. These new ideas did not, however, seek to deconstruct the consensus 
altogether, but pointed out its Eurocentric nature. One of the old notions namely, that 
the First World War brought about the end of empires and the universal victory of the 
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nation-state was challenged by the pervasive imperial nature of the victorious powers. 
In fact, this postcolonial reinvigoration of Versailles historiography started out with 
studies on non-European combatants  then turned to a reassessment of national self-
determination on a global scale, and  uestioned the structural significance of the peace 
settlement. 
John H. Morrow, in his chapter “The Imperial Framework” in T e  am ridge 
 i tory o  t e  ir t  orld  ar, argued that the unseen brutality and the claim to totality 
was but an application of colonial warfare on European soil. He traces back wartime 
annexationism and economic warfare to the amplification of imperialism before 191 . He 
further adds that European youth “literally yearned for war,” which had its root in 
Darwinism, pan-German and pan-Slavic ideas, as well as in what we might term 
 resilience movements’ emanating from the dearth of memories of European 
unpreparedness in the late-19th century colonial uprisings. Bringing back the ferocity of 
colonial warfare to Europe was apparent in the application of airplanes and dum-dum 
bullets hitherto banned in other than colonial warfare. The  introduction of savage war’ 
was further underlined by the introduction of colonial troops: using the  or e noir on 
European soil not only instilled fear in the hearts of enemies, but also generated concerns 
about the fate of European civilization at home (Morrow, 201 :  0 – 1 ). Imperialism 
thus provided a source of inspiration, the means of fighting, and war aims. As Jane 
Burbank and Frederick Cooper succinctly summarize, “It was empire that made the Great 
War a world war” (Burbank–Cooper, 2019:   ). 
Once again considered an  imperialist war’, it is surprising to claim that the peace 
settlement signaled the advent of the age of  nation-states.’ The idea that the Versailles 
system did away with empires and cemented the norm of nation-state, contributing to the 
decline of worldwide imperialism is so common that it is actually one of the diehard WWI 
to oi (Manela, 200 :    Dannreuther, 201 : 9 –9 ). It is true that the raging imperialist 
war presented a legitimacy deficit for empires, and the fact that even the victorious 
empires faced increasing pressure and resistance in the aftermath of war. However, as 
most colonial troops showed loyalty, and most local leaders supported the home front, 
the claim of  civilized’ and  civilizing’ empires led to a stabilization of colonial control 
for those on the winning side (Burbank–Cooper, 2019:  1–  ). On the other side of the 
spectrum, self-determination selectively used in Europe was altogether denied to 
colonial peoples. Moreover, some of the decision-makers warned against propagating 
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self-determination with a view to the possibly detrimental effect on the colonies 
(Burbank–Cooper, 2019: 91). 
Another important issue raised by this type of scholarship was the origin of self-
determination. It was set forth by  enin in his 191  “The socialist revolution and the right 
of nations to self-determination,” but it subse uently came to define and symbolize the 
American approach to peace. Even though the normative anti-imperialism of the U.S. is 
well-known, this is not an obvious outcome for a war involving empires. Its roots indeed 
run deeper: to the allied war aims, German diplomacy in the year 191 , the disruptive 
effect of the Bolshevik revolution on the war, and the internal hardships of the failing 
Eastern empires. First, one of the original British war aim was the salvaging of Belgium 
a tiny neutral country that had fallen prey to the German war machine and the idea to 
 protect’ the weaker nations. It has become part of Allied self-legitimacy and propaganda 
even as it lost some of its credibility with the Allied breach of Greek neutrality in 191  
(Soutou  02– 0 ). Wilson’s first addresses did not reveal a commitment to breaking up 
empires and supporting breakaway nationalities. On February 11, 191  he claimed in 
Congress that “this war had its roots in the disregard of the rights of small nations and of 
nationalities which lacked the union and the force to make good their claim to determine 
their own allegiances and their own forms of political life” ( td. in  eonhard, 201 :   0). 
It was in fact Germany who first raised the idea of self-determination to prominence: in 
the dual treaties of Brest- itovsk, self-determination became the ultimate basis that 
provided for the withdrawal of Russia to the East, and the heavily pro-German 
independence of Ukraine. Bolshevik Russia needed the demonstration of German power 
to follow this legalistic argument, but the Bolsheviks finally had to give in. It was thus 
this moment in early 191  when self-determination made its way from the saloons to the 
negotiating tables (Chernev, 2011). By this time, pure annexationism had faded away as 
a war aim: both sides wanted to create an economic order that is minimally legitimate for 
those under their sway, while serving their imperial interests as it does not necessarily 
re uire active policing of the territories concerned (for the economic outlook in peace 
designs, see: Soutou, 19 9 and 201 ). Notice that  enin’s ideas about anti-annexationism 
generated waves of enthusiasm on the European and American  eft, the net result of 
which was a “decisive left turn” in war aims and rhetoric (Anievas, 201 :    ). 
It was again Germany who following the failure of the Michael Offensive 
invoked  Wilsonian principles’ for the foundations of an armistice. The impossibility of 
a compromise peace became apparent in 191  and it was Germany out of necessity 
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who invoked the idea to put the peace negotiations on the basis of a wholly new 
international approach. Even if the Fourteen Points still not putting forward the 
inevitable breaking up of empires became instantly popular in North American and 
European public opinion, and was even praised by  enin, the Allied governments were 
anything but enthusiastic  (Knock, 199 : 11 ). Contrary to widely held beliefs, the 
Eastern empires were not doomed from the outset because of their internal weaknesses: 
the German Reich was not weak at all, Russia was able to transform itself into the Soviet 
Empire, recuperate its former territories and more. It was often said, however, that 
Austria–Hungary was so fatally feeble by this time that it dispersed rather than was 
dissolved. On the other hand, many claim that there was nothing inevitable about the 
unravelling of Austria–Hungary (Zimmer, 201 ).  
According to the oft-cited paraphrase, the U.S. wanted to make the world “safe 
for democracies.” What democracy meant in America by this time was almost e uivalent 
with the opposite of empire a political community that is united by manners and aims, 
within fix geographical borders, whose people are for the most part able to choose 
their type of government. The American idea, rooted in a national, federalist 
understanding of polity, could scarcely have been applied to a European, let alone an East 
European, context. In fact, when applied to the complex realities of ethnic, national, and 
traditional loyalties in Eastern and Southeastern Europe, the idea of self-determination 
was  uite different than what was imagined in the U.S. or in Western Europe ( eonhard, 
201 :   0,   1). War’s end saw a public perception that nation-states were dynamic and 
modern, able to harness the creative energies of whole nations  and that they combined 
external strength with internal unity. On the other hand, empires were seen as outdated, 
and doomed to fail because of their diverging levels of loyalties, heterogeneity and lack 
of common purpose ( eonhard, 201 :   1,   1). Given the complex ethnic and religious 
map of the region, the creation of nation-states inevitably gained an ethnic character 
(Keylor, 199 :    ), re uired intensive nation-building processes, and what is now often 
termed as the “de-mixing” or “unmixing of peoples” in order to reach a degree of national 
unity. In fact, both liberals, primarily interested in nation-building, and reactionaries, with 
their sharpened sense of nationhood, accepted the idea of radical population transfers to 
reach this goal (Burbank–Cooper, 2019: 90–92). This  unmixing’ of people was already 
underway before 191 , as was demonstrated during the Balkan Wars, but it undoubtedly 
became more widely accepted after Versailles. Contrary to the presupposed idea, these 
nation-states were thus not truly unitary inside. The net result of all this was, as J rg 
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 eonhard puts it, that “If there was a triumph of the model of a homogeneous nation-
state, it was more and more dissociated from the democratic principle in practice” 
( eonhard, 201 :    ). This is one of the cornerstones of a particular historiographical 
reassessment: empires are increasingly less seen as inevitably failing and as being by 
nature oppressive by the 1910s. Rather, as an organizational form of the state that is more 
willing and more successful in accepting internal differences than nation-states are 
(Burbank–Cooper, 2019:   ). In fact, one may argue that Wilsonism was designed to 
“make the world safe for demo ra ie ,” but eventually led to a European order that was 
safe for nationali m. Democracy, applied to the East European environment, exacerbated 
nationalism that in turn did not reinforce democracy. The international environment 
promoted, supported, and rewarded the idea of the nation-state, while the example of 
Turkey showed that a turn to being nation-state can lead to complete integration into the 
Versailles order. 
As identity issues came to the forefront in the 2000s, it reached the study of both 
the Great War and the Versailles settlement: how sovereignty and political legitimacy 
were created and represented during the wars became a ma or theme (Payk–Pergher 
2019). Minor identities and contradictory loyalties were highlighted: people from Alsace-
 orraine were examined, either their captivity in Germany for perceived disloyalty, or 
when drafted into the German army  against their will’ (malgré e  ) (Sawicki, 201   
Minasian–Kaneeva, 201 ). Timothy Baycroft dealt with identities and nation-building 
efforts in French Flanders (Baycroft 200 ). The experience of Poles, serving in the armies 
of three empires, is particularly interesting ( atawski, 1992).  ucian Boia wrote about 
the Romanization of Romania (Boia, 201 ), pointing to the complex dynamic of being 
Romanian, Hungarian, and Transylvanian in a state embarked on nation-building. In 
Greece, the different interpretations of nationalism an expansionist new, and an 
introverted old nationalism was identified as a ma or source of the National Schism 
(Mavrogordatos, 201 ). The “unmixing of peoples” was pronounced in most new nation-
states whether successor states or former empires. The lost, vibrant multiculturalism of 
the Hungarian capital was vividly described by John  ukacs ( ukacs, 19  ). All of the 
above were attempts at crossing the binary lines of victors and van uished, along with 
national histories and identities, pointing out the much more complex and shifting 
realities that were present during and after the war, and bearing serious conse uences for 
the future settlement of Europe. 
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While the Paris Peace Conference was intent on making a  world order’, there was 
not much order in the following years. There was a widespread feeling of “dual 
disillusionment”, a general disappointment in the ideas of international order itself, as 
well as those of domestic orders. Wilson knew that his visions raised expectations to a 
level where disillusionment was an inevitable conse uence: “When I gave utterance to 
those words  on the right to self-determination , I said them without the knowledge that 
nationalities existed, which are coming to us day after day      ou do not know and 
cannot appreciate the anxieties that I have experienced as a result of many millions of 
people having their hopes raised by what I have said” ( eonhard, 201 :    ). 
This did not usher in a period of peaceful international relations. Rather, it resulted 
in bitter conflict, mutual suspicion, and conflicting nationalisms in Europe (Burbank–
Cooper, 2019:  2). The cherished introduction of collective security and multilateral 
diplomacy could not deliver: instead, the fear of competing nationalisms, revisionist 
standings, and a general lack of faith in anything other than national strength led European 
countries to instantly revert to bilateral security treaties ( eonhard, 201 :    ). This could 
have been averted if there was a credible guarantee of international order behind the 
Versailles settlement, but neither Wilson, nor  loyd George seriously thought about that. 
Instead, they imagined to redress the continental balance whenever threatened by either 
power (cf. Trachtenberg, 2000: 19 –200). As Egerton pointed out in 19  , the British 
accepted the idea of the  eague of Nations as a pool in which American capacities would 
be  oined with theirs, and from which position they could arrange the unevenness of the 
European balance and keep control of colonial territories. After the withdrawal of the 
U.S. became apparent, the British were also considering to leave the  eague of Nations 
for the fear that administering a liberal international order would be too much of a burden, 
as they would not be able to uphold the balance of power without the Americans (Egerton, 
19  :   9– 9 ). Some of the treaty’s most characteristic features were drafted in the 
belief that the Americans were there to remain: it was the Americans and the British who 
demanded the entire sum of reparations from Germany, not the French. They thought that 
American banking would provide for a moderate means to collect it. While the reparations 
were by no means as harsh as their fame, their sum was calculated according to the 
American presence (Keylor, 199 :  9 – 02  Trachtenberg, 2000: 19 , 19 –19 ). The 
problem of the missing American underpinnings of the peace settlement was obvious 
from almost the beginning: from the proposed Geneva Protocol, to multiple French 
attempts to broker an alliance with the U.S., and to the  ocarno Treaties, much of the 
T. BARANYI  CO O RN              
  i    .             .    v      
   
 
interwar years’ diplomacy was about shoring up the Versailles order. The British soon 
realized that the U.S. is only an onlooker in European affairs, while the anti-revisionist 
powers lack the means to defend the system ( o k , 2  –290). 
Shortly before leaving the conference, Vittorio Orlando, Italian Prime Minister at 
the Paris Peace Conference, summarized the most serious deficiency of the peace treaties: 
“I cannot look forward without grave apprehensions to the future of continental Europe  
the German longing for revenge must be considered in con unction with the Russian 
position. We can thus see even now that the settlement to be arrived at will lack the assent 
of more than half the population of the European continent. If we detach from the block 
on which the new European system will have to rely for the support of forty million 
Italians, and force them into the ranks of the malcontents, do you think that the new order 
will rest on a firm basis ” (Butler, 19  : 22 ) The settlement thus  uickly became 
unpopular and illegitimate for many no one seriously wished to maintain it, while 
everyone saw its faults that came in strong contrast with the lofty declarations behind it 
( eonhard, 201 :   0–   ). The sense of disappointment and anger was probably even 
more pronounced amongst the elites of countries under colonial or semi-colonial rule. 
The Japanese, who did not succeed in cementing their position as a ma or power, or the 
Chinese, whose interests were almost altogether ignored, or the Indians, whose status did 
not budge, and all the people who cherished “self-determination” as a prospective way 
out of colonial rule, were bitterly disappointed and alienated from the Versailles 
settlement ( u, 201 :  0 – 09). 
 
 e onfi uration of t e  lo al  alan e of  o er 
Another cautious recognition emanating from postcolonial studies was the assumption 
that the war did not fully end in 191  and did not start in earnest in 191 . As Gerwart and 
Manela concludes, the First World War was an all-out war between empires who started 
a cycle of violence already in 1911 with the Italian occupation of  ibya. The spillover 
effects of the colonial war were felt during the Balkan Wars and then in the Great War, 
only to recede after the Treaty of  ausanne, the end of the Franco–Belgian occupation of 
the Rhineland, the granting of independence to Ireland, the Bolshevik victory in the 
Russian Civil War, and the reconfiguration of power in East Asia (Gerwart–Manela, 
201 :    – 9 ). Already in 199 , Felipe Fernández-Armesto pointed out that the First 
World War was essentially but “an umbrella term” (Fernández-Armesto, 199 :  1 ). The 
 continuation of violence’ and the  long ending’ of the First World War are ma or 
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concerns of historians since the 2010s. This new focus is well demonstrated by the fact 
that Alan Sharp’s 1991 synthesis once bore the subtitle “Peacemaking in Paris, 1919”, 
while the third edition, coming out in 201 , was titled “Peacemaking after the First World 
War, 1919-192 ” instead (Sharp, 1991 and 201 ). French historiography has focused on 
 the exiting from war’ ( ortie  de g erre), i.e. demobilization, reintegration, or the lack 
thereof, veterans’ issues, etc. (Flateau, 201 ). International aid missions in the aftermath 
of the war are also of particular significance (Glant–Ablonczy–Juhász 201 ). Refugees 
coming from successor state territories and the impact of Bolshevism and the 
 continuation of violence’ are also in the focus of the new historiography, such as in the 
work of the Trianon 100 research group (Ablonczy, 2010  Ablonczy, 201   Révész, 
201 ). Connected to the centenary of the Great War, this  long ending’ by now has 
become an integral part of researching WWI an approach actually more widely held in 
Eastern Europe (cf. Schmidt 2019). This  continuation of violence’ found expression in 
the most modern scholarship of the Great War with a focus on the brutalizing effect of 
the war, paramilitary organizations in the East and the West, and their detrimental impact 
on interwar Europe: scholars have examined the situation on a European and also on a 
global scale (Geyer, 19 9  Gerwarth–Horne, 2010  Gerwarth, 200 ) as well as at the level 
of particular countries, such as Turkey (Gingeras 2010). A cornerstone of centennial 
commemorations and research agendas is in uiry about veterans’ issues, their 
reintegration into society, their associations, and their politicisation (Mission Centenaire, 
2019  First World War Centenary, 2019  Trianon 100, 2019). The net result of this 
renewed interest was the emerging consensus that the deterioration of political culture in 
interwar Europe, the rise of Fascism and the expansion of Communism was not a  direct 
result’ of the Versailles settlement but an offshoot of the brutalizing effect of the Great 
War. Already in the early 1920s Mussolini envisioned the rule of tren  o ra y, i.e. the 
rule of those returning from the trenches. This, of course, never really materialised, but 
both Fascism and Communism actively built on the war experiences, the general 
resentment war caused, the heightened status of the state, and the devaluation of human 
lives. In a sense, states were becoming warfare states and welfare states at the same time 
during the war owing to the transformative effect of the Herculean task of mobilization 
and economic planning and they remained so well after  Armistice Day’ (cf. Horne, 
201 :  2 –   ). 
The  continuation of violence’ was indeed a reverberation of the fact that the 
Versailles settlement could not truly settle the problems that fueled the Great War. When 
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Germany decided to put down arms the situation was not like that of 19  . Conclusive 
military victory was not in sight. Germany, in spite of all of its setbacks, was still 
potentially the most powerful country on the continent (Marks, 201 :    ). Though the 
Habsburg, Ottoman, and Russian Empires crumbled and underwent serious changes in 
the aftermath of war, Germany was largely intact, and there was no foreign occupation.  
The normative nature of  defeat’, the exclusion of Berlin from the crucial points 
of the settlement, coupled with German power that was shaken but not broken, led to a 
situation where the  ei   was there to remain one of the most powerful countries after 
the war. Britain and France, ravaged and exhausted in war, facing colonial upheaval and 
financial difficulties, were in the role of victors but could not hold on to their power 
indefinitely. In fact, the true power relations were not clear at the table as was amply 
demonstrated by Anglo–French conflicts, Italy’s disappointment, the illusion of Greek 
power, the illusion of Turkish weakness, and overall, everyone’s attempt at manipulating 
Wilson. In a sense, the reshaping of East Europe was of secondary importance throughout 
the conference. The Paris Peace Conference, above all, can be perceived as a West 
European lobbying conference. Thus, the established scholarly consensus about the 
relative soundness of peacemakers and of the settlement (as in Tanner, 200   Keylor, 
199 ) is truly applicable only if Versailles is considered as a peace with Germany, or a 
peace settlement between the Eastern and Western halves of Europe. No lasting 
international order was set up, a great many conflicts were essentially halted only as late-
20th century  frozen conflicts’ would be in the future, imperial issues were mounting, and 
most of the world as well as most of Europe did not see itself as a stakeholder in 
maintaining the settlement. Ironically, the settlement might have been good enough to 
settle a war with Germany but definitely not to settle a world war  although the  dark 
legend’ of Versailles for decades has been focusing on the maltreatment of Germany. 
Another often overlooked factor of the peace settlement was the wholesale 
devaluation of Europe as the center of world politics and the world economy. John Horne 
 uoted the French poet Paul Valéry: “We modern civilisations  like those of anti uity  
now know that we too are mortal.” Europe, as ancient Greece before it, ceased to be the 
crux of world affairs, or so this was perceived. Such an assessment was easily seen in the 
culture of the interwar years: Oswald Spengler’s T e  e line o  t e  e t was published 
in 191   T. S. Eliot’s war-inspired modernist poem T e  a te  and was out in 1922, 
while Ortega y Gasset’s T e  e olt o  t e Ma  e  in 1929. Cultural relativism established 
itself in academia and in public consciousness a development unimaginable before the 
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war (Fernández-Armesto, 199 :    –   ). John  ukacs repeatedly pointed to the rise and 
decline of the liberal bourgeoisie and its impact. According to him, the most important 
and pervasive feeling after the war was the devaluation of middle class virtues and 
manners, and the outright denial thereof, as was manifest in Spengler’s work ( ukacs, 
201 :   – 0). Europe’s decline as cultural and political center is also a ma or theme in 
the newer historiography of WWI that employs powerful imagery. Christopher Clarke’s 
superb account about the outbreak of the war is titled Slee  alker  referring to the short-
sightedness of pre-war statesmen as he attributes  war guilt’ to all of the ma or parties. 
Sean McMeekin, in his T e     ian  rigin  o  t e Great  ar, stresses the importance of 
Russia’s imperial design in the outbreak of the war. He even claims the Great War to have 
been “the Ottoman War of Succession”, with a fair degree of convincing power. The fact 
that Europe was losing ground was apparent in culture but not in politics, however. The 
reconfiguration of power was not according to the present or pro ected power relations 
but in many cases obscured by aggravated perceptions, expectations, and a  culture of 
defeat.’ As John Horne puts it: “  the scale and repercussions of the displacement  of 
power  were masked in the interwar period by the relative effacement of the two states, 
the USA and the USSR, which would redefine world power in bi-polar terms after a 
further round of European self-destruction in 19 9–  ” (Horne, 201 :    ). This feature 
of  being masked’ is also implied by some of the alternative labels that exist for the Great 
War, as in “the hundred years’ war of Europe” (referring to the whole of the 20th century), 
or in “Greater War”, referring to the period from 1911 191  to 192 . The underhanded 
power shift among great powers, blurred by normative politics and tradition, led to a 
 uestioning of both the contours and the outcome of the war (cf. Schmidt, 2019). 
The U.S., on the other hand, was clearly an ascendant power. This phenomenon 
was also masked to a certain extent by the inextricable web of power dynamics during 
the Paris Peace Conference. The extent to which American ideas could transcend 
European politics was a  uestion of European resistance. It is surprising, however, how 
both liberal apologists and conservative criti ues both accepted the notion that the 
Americans were truly idealist, for better or worse (Anievas, 201 :  20). In fact, the idea 
that American idealism was a diametrical opposite to realist balance-of-power thinking 
was pervasive over decades of scholarship. For instance, Henry Kissinger takes idealism 
vs. realism as the central issue in Wilsonism although he skillfully distinguishes idealist 
rhetoric and the realist assessment around the formation of NATO in 19 9 (Kissinger, 
199   Kissinger, 2012). It was relatively late when a ma or thesis emerged to the effect 
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that Wilsonism might be perceived as realist self-interest wrapped in idealist rhetoric, and 
that idealism in fact served tactical national interests (Ninkovich, 1999  Kennedy, 200   
Anthony, 200 ). 
As the historiography of American foreign relations underwent some changes and 
 Republican empire’ became a ma or area of interest ( afeber 199   Weeks 201 ), 
American idealism and its implications were also increasingly looked upon in a different 
light. Even though Akira Iriye interprets the interwar years in a positive and non-
imperialist framework, the title of his book T e Glo alizing o   meri a            
(Iriye, 199 ) points to the fact that  American isolationism’ is not the right framework to 
address U.S. foreign policy in the interwar years. In fact, isolationism was a fair rhetoric 
on the side especially of those American politicians who represented constituency that 
was not involved in international trade (Nazirny, 200 ), but actually both Wilsonians and 
fierce criti ues of Wilson apprehended the changing role of the U.S. that had to follow 
WWI. What was debated, however, was “what type of internationalism” to choose: active 
or passive, interventionist or  isolationist’, diplomatic or commercial. Supporters of 
Theodore Roosevelt were no less internationalists as Wilson was, but they perceived the 
role of the U.S. differently (Condra, 201 ). 
Anievas, while accepting the idealist side of the coin, asserts that liberal 
internationalism was persistently conceived in “terms of serving narrowly defined US 
national interests above all, the pursuit of US global supremacy” (Anievas, 201 :  2 ). 
U.S. national interests, given that for a long century North America has not been credibly 
threatened by outside powers, was first and foremost commercial: freedom of the seas 
and of trade. For Wilson and many of his contemporaries it was inevitable that “the 
East” open up and transform, and it was up to America and Britain to govern and master 
this transformation. The expansion of U.S. capital and liberal American ideas were 
mutually reinforcing. The United States, after all, was the “city upon a hill,” a model for 
the rest of the world. What was strikingly different in U.S. and European expansionism 
was of course the non-territoriality of the former. Washington was aiming at the 
expansion of capital, culture, and trade on e ual terms with the European powers the 
globalization of “Open Door policy.”  Backward’ territories would eventually develop 
into decent countries with the help of American technology, ideas, and money. The 
remedy for war, destruction, backwardness, and international selfishness was thus an 
 intracapitalist understanding’ about the mutually acceptable management of world 
affairs. This propelled the  eague of Nations originally an idea of the British  eft to 
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paramountcy in Wilson’s ideas. The Bolshevik menace, as well as the vindictive Treaty 
of Brest- itovsk changed expectatons: Germany was, for the time being, dispensed from 
the advanced capitalist countries which were to form an international framework  and 
Bolshevik ideas of revolution necessitated a liberal response that was attractive for the 
European  eft. Not an American contempt towards Empires, but the Bolshevik challenge 
caused the left turn in American vision that resulted in the championing of self-
determination. The difference was substantial: while  enin sought to facilitate revolution 
with self-determination, Wilson wanted to build it up as a bulwark against radicalism and 
revolution (Anievas, 201 :  2 –  2  Keylor, 199 :   1–  2  Manela, 200 :  9–  ). 
Anievas in his convincing analysis argues that while the idealist framework was not a 
mere smokescreen, liberal internationalism was another side of liberal empire, where 
racially hierarchal, development-driven crisis resolution can serve the interests of a world 
whose interests were deemed identical to U.S. national interests (Manela, 200 :  2 –
 2 ). 
The Versailles settlement, of which the leading impulse was coming from the U.S. 
as the great creditor nation for both sides, was one of the first steps in the  uest to global 
supremacy. In order to globalize America, the most important issue to deal with was in 
fact the role of Britain and the second was the issue of the remaining European powers. 
Bottelier argues that the Great War destroyed “gold standard and the first globalization”, 
and Britain, as the main architect and beneficiary of both, lost its status (Bottlier, 201 : 
 ). The fact that the  golden age’ of the British Empire was over came through clearly to 
many: influential persons close to  loyd George have long argued for a federal 
restructuring of the Empire, to better match power relations within its confines, and to 
create the possibility of merging with the U.S. at some future time. Federalism, an 
imperial answer to preserve both unity and difference was seen as a “way out of empire” 
(Burbank–Cooper, 2019:   , 99) but the Round Table circle went even further: they 
wanted to make the inevitable process of tran lation im erii a swift and painless one by 
achieving the maximum of Anglo–American cooperation (Roberts, 200   D’Onofrio, 
2019). However, even though a high degree of cooperation was reached by  ondon and 
Washington, the non-ratification of the treaty and the  abandonment’ of Europe caused a 
bitter read ustment of British policy (Egerton, 19  ). On the other hand, the longer term 
processes of the American overtaking of oil, telecommunication, and aviation industries 
was underway since the Paris Peace Conference (Hugill, 2009). The Washington Naval 
Conference in turn sealed Britain’s traditional role in policing and controlling the high 
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seas: they did relin uish some of their freedom in naval issues and accepted their 
secondary role in the Pacific in order not to frustrate the possibility of a later Anglo–
American cooperation (Goldstein, 199 ). If real power relations were, according to 
Horne, masked during the Paris Peace Conference, so was the exact nature of relations 
between the most advanced industrial and naval nations, Britain and the U.S. The power 
transition between the two, and its motivations and repercussions are not completely new 
spots on the research agenda, but their centrality is a ma or development. 
Similarly important was the wholesale Americanization of European politics and 
culture. American standards, rhetoric and political philosophy was thriving on the old 
continent, and found its expression in the arts, in popular taste, and in finances. 
International finances, dominated by the U.S., were of particular importance: the “de-
politicization of international economies” (Anievas, 201 :   2) was underway. The 
cultural impact of the U.S. was paramount in Western Europe, especially in Germany. As 
F. Scott Fitzgerald put it, the Americans were going to be the Romans, as were till then 
the British (Costigliola, 19  : 1 –22, 1  –1 9, 1  ). The  eague of Nations, though 
dysfunctional in many ways, was after all an American design. The leading tenets of non-
Fascist European politics, nationalism, disarmament, the primacy of stability and 
commerce, and the expanding vision of self-determination were all American imports. 
During the days of the war, Wilson himself prophesied: “When the war is over, we can 
force them  the Entente powers  to our way of thinking” (Fernández-Armesto, 199 :  19). 
The liberal American Empire was, in a sense, idealistic  but its more tangible feature was 
its pragmatism. 
 
Con lusion 
The study of the Versailles peace settlement well illustrates that historiography evolves 
according to the accessibility of sources and also the impressions of contemporary 
interpretations. The earliest historiographical debates revolved around the harshness of 
the treaty with Germany (but not necessarily with the minor members of the Central 
Powers), the war guilt clause and the diehard classic of who started the war  as well as 
the transition from the settlement to the rise of Fascism and beyond. 
A closer scrutiny of the papers in the 19 0s pointed out the relative moderation of 
the French  the exact nature of the war aims and their effects on peacemaking  a closer 
look at the relationship between  eninism and Wilsonism  and the debunking of the  war 
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guilt myth’. The result of this was a more moderate and unbiased assessment of Versailles 
with occasionally too lenient undertones. 
This new consensus, partly popularized by Macmillan’s ex uisitely written book, 
was increasingly  uestioned when contemporary political issues renewed interests in 
issues of empires vs. nation-states, sovereignty and integration, and the fate of American 
hegemony. This impulse originally came from postcolonial scholars and it changed how 
we see the Versailles settlement on a global scale. It exposed that Versailles was a 
European peace to settle a world war  that emotional and political dissociation from the 
treaties in Europe actually killed its chances of success  that the continuation of violence 
and the blurred lines of new power structures  uestioned the nature of the settlement 
which had mostly a freezing effect on international conflicts  that the rule of the liberal 
bourgeoisie and their manners were essential in the postwar vision  that new nation-states 
were becoming imperial, while empires were becoming more akin to nation-states  that 
the nostalgia for dissolved empires had contributed to ideas of European integration  and 
that American isolationism might refer to politics but definitely not to international 
economy. 
The history of the Versailles settlement is immensely important as a ma or 
cornerstone in 20th century history and a departure point for the study of international 
relations. A transnational and global history was unfolding in the 2010s with increasingly 
more differentiated sources and viewpoints added to the analysis. What is still missing 
from the picture is the inclusion and comparative analysis of Eastern European views, 
narratives, and impulses. Postcolonial scholarship propelled China, India, African 
colonies, etc. into a central position, but still, Western accounts of the settlement often 
appear without a reference to Eastern Europe, or are only paying marginal attention to the 
region. This is partly due to the nature of East Europe, with its small and inaccessible 
languages, the failure of the societies concerned to link national to global histories, and 
the socially and politically contested nature of the topic that serves as an excellent 
experimental diorama for the  politics of memory.’ Some of the minor treaties are under-
researched due to being overshadowed by subse uent events (such as the Treaty of 
Neuilly-sur-Seine), or dealt with in different frameworks (such as the Treaty of Trianon, 
Saint-Germain-en- aye, or S vres). Partly because of the concurrent nationalisms and 
biased historiographical approaches, partly for lack of interest, international 
historiographies thus do not accentuate the relevant  uestions regarding Eastern Europe. 
The process of linking  forgotten evidence’ from Eastern Europe to the global picture has 
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started, nonetheless (see e.g. Stone, 199   McMeekin, 201   Chernev, 2011), but there 
still is a long way to go to reach a truly global assessment of the Versailles peace 
settlement. 
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